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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Arthur Rollin*
Evidence Obtained by Local Police Through
Illegal Wiretap Admissible in Federal Court-New
York city police suspected the defendant and his
brother of dealing in narcotics. Based on the suspicion, the police obtained a warrant, in accordance
with New York law, from the Supreme Court of
that state, to tap the phone at a bar that the
brothers frequented. While listening to a conversation between the defendant and another person,
the police learned that "eleven pieces" were to be
moved. Acting on this information, the police
stopped a car driven by the defendant's brother,
but instead of finding narcotics, the police found
eleven cans of alcohol without the required federal
stamps. The evidence was turned over to federal
authorities, who did not know of the method by
which the evidence was obtained. However, at the
defendant's trial for illegal possession and transportation of distilled spirits without tax stamps
attached, the fact was brought out that the evidence was obtained through the use of a wiretap
in violation of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.A. (1939). The defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was
denied and he was convicted. The United States
Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction, held
that wiretap evidence obtained by state officers
was inadmissible in a federal prosecution. United
States v. Benanti, 23 U.S.L. Week 4045 (U.S. Dec.
9,1957).
Section 605 of the F.C.A. provides that: ".
no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.. ." (Italics added) In construing the meaning of this section, the Court
relied on the cases of Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379 (1937) and 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The
Court said that the Nardone cases set forth the
underlying premises upon which all subsequent
consideration of Section605 is based, and creates a
prohibition against the use of evidence obtained
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through a violation of that section in a federal
prosecution. The Courtstated that Section 605 was
violated, in the federal court, if not earlier, "upon
the disclosure to the jury of the existence of the
intercepted communication," which is forbidden
by that section. Thus, the fact that the evidence
was initially obtained by state police officers was of
little consequence and the policy that allows evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure by state police officers to be admissible in a
federal court is not applicable, according to the
Court. The Court also pointed out that any state
regulation of wiretapping that conflicts with
Section 605 is ineffectual.
Warrant for Search of "Premises" as Basis
for Lawful Search of Outlying Shed-Federal
officers secured a warrant to search the "premises'
at two adjoining street addresses. After the officers
had searched the houses at both addresses, and
found nothing, they proceeded to search the sheds
located on the same property. The defendant was
ordered to produce the key to a shed that was some
distance from the houses, and upon doing so, the
officers entered it and discovered a quantity of
alcohol, that did not have the required tax stamps
affixed, and some of the components of a still. At
the defendant's trial for unlawfully engaging in the
distillery business without providing the required
bond, and possession of untaxed alcohol, he unsuccessfully moved to have the evidence the officers
found in the shed suppressed. The United States
Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction and held that a warrant to search the premises
at specific addresses was broad enough to allow
the officers to search anything on the lot or parcel
of ground where the houses at those addresses were
located. Ramsey v. United States, 245 F.2d 295
(9th Cir. 1957).
The court rejected the defendant's contention
that since the warrant had been issued for the
search of the premises at specific addresses, only
the houses denoted by those addresses could be
legally searched. The court construed the word
"premises" in the warrant very broadly and said
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that its use in the warrant allowed the officers to
search anywhere on the lot or parcel of ground
upon which the houses bearing the street addresses
were located.
Informer's Tip Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
Under the Federal Narcotic Control Act-A known
informer supplied to federal narcotic agents certain
information concerning the defendant. After checking their own files and finding nothing, the agents
called the narcotic detail of the Chicago police
department and were told that they had a file on
the defendant. The agents, using the description of
the defendant supplied by the informer, located
the defendant and arrested him without the use of
a warrant. The defendant was searched and a
quantity of narcotics was found. After being
charged with the unlawful purchase and receipt of
a narcotic drug, the defendant, at a pre-trial
hearing, made a motion to suppress the evidence
found on his person. The United States Courts of
Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion and held
that the informer's tip constituted reasonable
grounds for arrest and thus the evidence was
admissible because it was secured incidtent to a
lawful arrest. United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d
519 (7th Cir. 1957).
The Court recognized the well-established rule
that evidence secured incidental to a lawful arrest
is admissible. In ascertaining the legality of the
defendant's arrest, the court looked to Section 104
(a) of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956. This
section confers upon agents of the Bureau of Narcotics the power to "make arrests without warrant
for violations of any law of the United States
relating to narcotic drugs ...

or marihuana...

where the violation is committed in the presence
of the person making the arrest or where such
person has reasonable grounds to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed or is committing such violation." (Emphasis added.) The
defendant contended that the informer's tip was
hearsay and consequently inadmissible to show
reasonable grounds for arrest. In rejecting this
contention, the court stated that the issue at the
pre-trial hearing was not the guilt of the defendant,
but the state of mind of the arresting agent. Although the tip was hearsay as to the defendant, it
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was not hearsay as to the agent, and constituted
reasonable grounds upon which to base an arrest
without a warrant.
Coin Operated Crane and Claw Machines Are
Gambling Devices-A sheriff seized three machines on the grounds that their operation constituted a violation of the state's gambling statutes.
Each machine consisted of a glass cabinet with a
crane to pick up certain objects from the floor of
the cabinet. The crane moved along a prearranged
path, and the owner of the machine could place
the objects to be picked up, which he would redeem for $1, in any position. A player of the
machine would first set the position of the claw
by manipulating the boom of the crane, and then
insert into the machine a coin that activated a
mechanism that would drop the claw and close it.
The player could then remove any'thing caught by
the claw by depositing it in a shute. The owner of
the machines sued the sheriff in an action for
replevin to recover the machines, and succeeded in
the lower court. The Supreme Court of Arizona,
however, reversed and held that the machines were
gambling devices and thus subject to confiscation
by the sheriff. Bojes v. Bartell, 310 P.2d 834, 82
Ariz 217 (1957)
The statutory provisions upon which the court
relied were Sections 13-431 to 33 of A.R.S. These
sections

stated that ". .. every slot machine,

punchboard, or machine of like character.. .." is a
gambling device. The court based its decision on
the test of whether or not a player's skill was more
determinative in the results achieved than the
elements of chance. The skill that the court considered was not that of an experienced player, but
that of the average person or the general public,
because the purpose of the statutes is to protect
the general public. In making its determination,
the court considered the limited control that the
player had over the operation of the crane and
claw, as compared to such obstacles as the predetermined path of the crane, the size and shape of
the item to be caught, and the arrangement of
these items.
(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 541-543,
supra.)

